This article implements a mathematical model for legal analysis, recently construed by the authors, to describe the legal axiological equilibrium of the legal rules on personal freedom and on freedom of movement. It then analyses the derivation of the legal principle on human persona from such two rules, through the duplication of one element which is in common to the two rules at stake. Finally a factor of discretionary uncertainty (i.e. an amount of legal entropy) is defined and calculated.
Introduction
We have recently developed a mathematical model for legal analysis. In several papers and articles [1, 2] , we have argued that any legal value and situation can be converted into strings of numbers bearing a thorough legal significance, so that, at the end of the day, the conflicts among legal values could be solved in a rather objective way. The output deriving from the application of this model to legal phenomena consists of a certain margin of discretionary power (well defined and bounded) at disposal of the decision-maker, beyond which the decision becomes unreasonable and postulates a legal remedy. We refer to our previous publications for a complete explanation of the fundamentals of this model and for further legal references. Just to make understandable the following reasoning which is the object of this paper, we will trace here below some basic concepts of the model at stake.
Some basics on Ferrara-Gaglioti's model
Legal rules serve so as to assign a certain legal value to any legal situation [3] . Hence, through the legal rules, legal facts and objects receive a legal qualification in terms of legal value (legal axiology). The legal rule consists of two components: a fact and an effect, linked together by means of a legal causality connection, which goes forward from the fact to the effect [4, 5] . Fact and Effect are situations described by the rule, and consist of elements. Each element embodies a concept, corresponding to an object of reality or of human thinking. Inside a legal situation the elements which compose it, are linked via a logical link, because some elements presuppose another element and so on [1, 2] . Just to simplify, the case of our present articles consists of two legal rules and one legal principle. The first Rule (I) is that on personal freedom; the second Rule (II) is that on freedom of movement; the legal principle is that on "human persona" deriving from the consideration of the element "human being" which is common to the above legal rules I and II. Ultimately, all of the elements of the legal structures can be ordered according to the logical linkages of supposition and consequentiality which connect them. The origin of the legal structure is by definition the legal subjectivity, as the ultimate center of attribution of any legal qualification and of any human interest. Legal values own two dimensions [6, 7] : axiological Height describes the level of appreciation that a value receives by the legal system. For example, it is usually assumed that the right to human life [8] is axiologically higher than the right to property. Instead axiological Strength describes the easiness of recognition of a legal value. In effect, the right to material property, in this sense, may be assumed to be stronger than the right to immaterial property. The traditional legal doctrine [6, 7] generally assumes that such two dimensions are inversely linked between themselves. Hence, the higher a value, the weaker it will be. In our model we have developed a set of tools to analytically describe such two axiological dimensions, and the way axiological legal potentials are generated. Once we have logically ordered all of the elements of a legal structure, we assume that the nearer each element is to the subjectivity (origin of the legal order), the higher it axiologically is. Moreover, the nearer each legal element is to the periphery of the logically ordered legal structure, the higher it axiologically is. In effect the subjectivity, as the center of any legal attribution, gives appreciation to the legal elements which are logically nearer to it. Instead the proximity of an element to the periphery of the logically ordered legal structure, gives to it more Strength, as the legal observer in the material world is logically placed at the end of the logical chain of the ordered sequence of elements which compose a legal structure. If we mathematically describe these assumptions, we get two mathematical functions, one for axiological Height, the latter for axiological Strength. We can then calculate legal potentials for each element, for each situation and for each legal rule of the legal system. The mathematical function for axiological Height (H) is the following:
Legenda: H: axiological Height n: one element of the structure Tn: the logical position of n within the sequence of the legal structure e: Neperus' constant The mathematical function for the axiological Strength (F) is the following: Legenda: F: axiological Strength Tmax: logical position of the ultra-peripheral element of the legal structure Tn: logical position of n element e: Neperus' constant Moreover, we observe that the logical ordering of a legal structure gives rise to some margins of uncertainty. In effect, while attributing a logical time to the position of every element inside the legal structures, sometimes the legal operator can bump into some elements that, according to the point of view taken into account, can assume a different logical time. In this way, it could be impossible to determine the axiological potentials to be assigned to that element. This logical contradiction is to be solved, according to our opinion, by giving prevalence to a privileged standpoint, the one of the external observer, placed at the periphery of the orderly legal chain of elements of the legal structure. The difference between the axiological potential of that element in the two possible positions of it inside the legal sequence of elements, is the matrix of legal discretion, as this quota of axiological legal potential is not univocally determined. We have called this fraction of legal mass, as gap mass. Finally, when we sum up a legal fact and a legal effect to build up a legal rule, it may happen that the same element occurs both in fact and effect. If the position of such element in both fact and effect is identical no gap Mass emerges, instead legal Entropy is generated. This happen if Tmax of the Fact and Tmax of the Effect are different. In such case the dimension of axiological Strength associated to the duplicated element differs when the rule has been built up. It will occur that the Strength of this element within the rule is less than its Strength within the structure of its single situation (fact or effect). We observe that just the dimension of axiological Strength vary in this case, depending on the difference in Tmax. On the contrary the cypher of axiological Height rests the same in any situation, as it depends on the Distance from the origin placed at T=0. The creation of Legal Entropy has been described by us in terms of an axiological surplus, and specifically as a rent, which can be the object of a policy on the part of the legal system [1, 2] . This rent can be adjudicated either by the owner of the legal situation, or by the whole legal system. In any case, there is a certain margin of axiological potential which has been generated through the shaping of a more complex legal structure (i.e. of a legal rule formed from two basic situations, the fact and the effect). Hence, duplicated mass within a legal rule can give rise to Gap Mass and to Legal Entropy. In both case there is room for a policy of the decision-maker and this adds to factors of uncertainty and discretional power. In the cases at stake in this article, the duplicated element is "Human Being". Providing that it assumes the same logical position in both facts and effects under consideration, no Gap mass emerges. Instead, given that in the rules at stake Tmax of the Facts and of the Effects are different, there is the emergence of Legal Entropy, as a factor of uncertainty [9, 10] .
2 Implementation of the model to the rule on personal freedom.
The legal rule at stake can be drafted as follows: for any human being, its If we sum up the axiological legal potential associated to the element "human being" in the two rules at stake, we can derive from the rules on two rights of freedom the legal principle on "human persona". This is an axiological legal potential without a legal structure. It indicates the potential to be associated to an element which appears in more than one legal rule. The potential of a principle can be used to solve axiological legal conflicts and can influence its result. In the case at issue the axiological legal potential (W) of the principle (P) on "human persona" at issue (derived from Rule I on personal freedom and Rule II on freedom of movement, in which the element "a", i.e. "human being", is duplicated) is to be determined as follows:
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Conclusion
We finally observe that summing up two legal structures (fact and effect) of second order [1, 2] -i.e. legal rules -we can form a legal structure of third orderi.e. legal principles; and considering the elements in common to more than one rule, we can produce a legal principle within the system. The potential associated to rules and principles can be algebraically added to solve the axiological conflicts among legal entitlements. We therefore pledge for the introduction of a formal theory of algebraical legal axiology, in order to adjudicate legal claims in a rather objective way, without forgetting that a certain margin of discretionary power is strictly inherent to any human legal decision. In quantitative terms it is easy to reckon that the axiological potential associated to a principle is even greater than the axiological potential of each of the two rules from which it has been derived. Hence legal principles constitute a rather powerful weapon to determine and to influence the result of an axiological conflict among legal entitlements.
